Themes from Smith and Rousseau 2015 Abstracts

Tuesday 21st July

Session 1 (0900-1030)

Panel A *Morality*: Rousseau and Smith on Music and the Imitative Arts

Location: Humanity Lecture Theatre Chair: Charles Griswold (IASS)

Kris Worsley (Guildhall): Smith, Rousseau and the sentiments of impassioned musical expression.

Abstract

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith wrote that, 'Joy, grief, love, admiration, devotion, are all of them passions which are naturally musical'. In providing an account of the musical attributes of these emotions, both in this work and in his essay 'Of the Imitative Arts', Smith was keen to draw a line between the expressive properties of vocal music and instrumental music. This aesthetic distinction brought his interpretation of moral sentiments and sympathetic response directly in line for comparison with many prominent music and literary theorists of the day. His approach to the musicality of the sentiments provides a counterpoint to the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose musical and philosophical works share a number of Smith's themes, including discussions of language formation, linguistic accent, impassioned expression, and sympathetic response.

In this paper, I will evaluate the relationship between both writers' ideas on musical expression, placing them within the wider context of 18th century music theory both in Britain and right across Europe. In particular, I will focus upon the aspects of musical composition in the Age of Enlightenment which relate specifically to solo instrumental performance.

Rousseau's ideas on the relationship between an individual's sentiments and a performer's practical musical expression, expressed most clearly in his manuscript 'Essay on the Origin of Languages', as well as in earlier, published writings, can be seen to echo through the writings of European music theorists such as Heinrich Christoph Koch, as well as theorists of literature such as Daniel Webb.

At the same time, composers and writers on music were beginning to explore various means by which to create the illusion of a spontaneous emotional expression, both in notated music and in improvised performance. These aspects of composition will be explored with reference to music by C. P. E. Bach and Mozart, as well as works by less well-known composers, such as Beethoven's teacher, Christian Gottlob Neefe. The underlying aesthetic principles of these works will also be contrasted with those of the Italian and English schools of composition.

I will argue that the reading of 18th century solo repertoire that results has far-reaching implications for our interpretation of Rousseau's and Smith's writings, ranging extensively across both their outputs.

Denise Schaeffer (Holy Cross): Elevation and Corruption: The Dual Character of Imitation in Rousseau and Smith

Abstract

In the spirit of this joint conference, this essay compares Smith and Rousseau on the necessary yet fraught relationship between imitation and virtue. Both thinkers recognize the precarious character (simultaneously positive and negative) of imitation, albeit with different emphases. Smith emphasized the positive role of imitation yet was at the same time aware that misguided imitation (based on misjudgment) of poor exemplars could have a corrupting effect. For Rousseau, the problem of corruption loomed much larger, and for the most part he associated imitation with moral decay rather than with moral elevation. Yet in *Emile* and "On Theatrical Imitation," Rousseau offers a qualified defense of certain forms of imitation. Thus, even as Smith emphasizes the positive potential of imitation and Rousseau the negative, both recognize the other side of the argument and address the resulting complexity.

To better understand both the similarities and differences in these two complex accounts, and their broader significance, I propose to look closely at Rousseau's "On Theatrical Imitation" (and relevant passages in *Emile*) alongside Smith's "Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called The Imitative Arts" (and relevant passages from TMS) to explore how their two accounts of the complexity of imitation—in which something akin to aesthetic imitation assumes a moral function—both point to a fundamental and perhaps intractable puzzle about the relationship between virtue and judgment.

In particular, I shall consider the implications of Smith's insistence in "Imitative Arts" that it is not exact replication but rather "the *disparity* between the imitating and the imitated object" that is "the foundation of the beauty of imitation." (I.14.183, emphasis added), and contrast it with Rousseau's stance toward imitation in "On Theatrical Imitation," which consists of a semi-faithful imitation of Socrates' critique of poetry. Whereas Smith explicitly states his claim about the significance of disparity, Rousseau *demonstrates* this point. Taking the performative quality of Rousseau's argument into account, I argue that he, like Smith, appreciated the importance of imperfection and disparity—not simply in the imitative arts, but also in the emulation of virtue.

Michael O'Dea (Lyon II Lumiere): Smith and Rousseau On Imitation in the Arts

Abstract

This paper will propose a reading of Smith's essay "Of the Nature of that Imitation which Takes Place in what are Called The Imitative Arts" against a French backdrop.

France has a substantial tradition of reflection on artistic imitation in the eighteenth century, with a fundamental contribution by l'abbé Dubos early in the century, *Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture* and a whole constellation of works between 1740 and 1770, among which could be cited Batteux, *Des Beaux-Arts réduits à un même principe*, Condillac's *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines*, D'Alembert's *Discours préliminaire* for the *Encyclopédie*, several works by Diderot, and from Rousseau the articles on music in the *Encyclopédie*, the *Lettre sur les spectacles*, and the *Dictionnaire de musique*.

The argument will be that Smith was aware of a significant part of this body of reflection on his subject, enters into debate with his French predecessors, and uses them to enrich his own thought. In particular, Smith shows that he has read relevant articles of Rousseau's *Dictionnaire de musique* attentively, and in many respects remains close to Rousseau.

Relevant questions include the origin of song, the forms of music and dance found among "the savage nations," and the relative merits of French and Italian opera. The main focus of the paper will however be on the imitative power of music. Smith follows Rousseau in rejecting the literal imitation of natural sounds. Both present musical imitation as an expressive and affective art, rooted in human relations and finding its most perfect form on the operatic stage.

Panel B *Politics*: Smith and Rousseau on Justice

Location: Room G466 Chair: Jason Neidleman (RA)

Neil Saccamano (Cornell): Rousseau and Smith: Sympathy, Justice, and Cosmopolitics

Abstract

My paper will investigate the problematical status of international relations in both Rousseau and Smith. In Rousseau, I will highlight moments when Rousseau offers a critique of the pre-reflective character of pity and affirms the possibility of a cosmopolitics (especially in the texts on perpetual peace and the state of war) as a solution to conflicts between nation-states, however legitimately founded on the general will. In the *Discourse of Political Economy,* for instance, Rousseau states the general will as the rule of justice is defective and fallible with regard to foreigners, just as he insists in the *Émile* that the immediate, unthinking sentiment of pity as "humanity" must become "enlightened" (*éclairé et sage*), "generalized and extended to the whole of mankind" so that one then "yields to it (*s'y livre*) only insofar as it accords with justice." Otherwise, "we really become enemies of the human race." For Rousseau, despite his repeated dismissal of deracinated cosmopolitans, the supposedly impossible politics of humanity becomes conceivable if one accepts that "law comes before justice" and that, despite the premise of the patriot as the enemy of humankind, the "State gives us an idea" of a "general Society" (*Geneva Manuscript*). Yet, this possibility is not developed in Rousseau's political theory as if in recognition that love of the *patrie,* like *amour propre,* cannot be overcome or extended in practice.

It has been quite common in Smith scholarship to differentiate the reflective, mediated, or cognitive status of sympathy from the notion of pity as sheer natural impulse in Rousseau, yet in both justice raises the issue of cosmopolitics. In the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, the impartial spectator as conscience must function as the impersonal "grammar" of justice which, however, would become indistinguishable from injustice if the spectator were to act autonomously and in utter indifference (disinterestedness) of the sympathy and approval of actual others (friends, family, compatriots on the basis of "habitual affection"). Like Rousseau, Smith asserts that there is no natural affection for "a great society of mankind," but only love of our own country based on the contingencies of place, custom, habit; yet this love of country is also partiality, prejudice, and hence injustice. To reverse Smith's formulation in the spirit of a cosmopolitical Rousseau: "the noble [principle] of the love our own country" is often founded on "the mean principle of national prejudice." What differentiates Smith from Rousseau with regard to the admitted injustice of nationalism seems to be the failure, or refusal, to imagine the consonance of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. In contrast to Rousseau, Smith remains with the unjust nation-state as the condition of moral practice and dismisses international relations as a sacrifice of one's self-interest and identity--which is "the business of God, not man."

Jimena Hurtado Prieto (Los Andes): Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on Justice as an Attribute of Individuals and Institutions

Abstract

Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau consider justice as the cornerstone of human society. Without it there is no possibility of enduring social life, and thus of human preservation. This view marks a strong and profound agreement between these authors who stand on opposite sides when evaluating market society. It is well known that whereas Smith underlined the merits of this kind of social arrangement, which he believed brought about interdependence and better living conditions for all its members, Rousseau denounced it for exacerbating artificial inequalities and making freedom impossible.

Their radically different views seem to come together under the idea of justice, as if it were possible to advance that their disagreement stems from the conditions of justice. Smith would show that justice is possible in this society; on the contrary, Rousseau would stress its impossibility. This interpretation would indicate that justice means the same for both. This is the point I would like to examine in this document. I intend to do so not by asking what justice is or how it emerges in each of these authors. No doubt, both questions are relevant, and I will try to explore them in the text. The first question would lead us to define justice as a negative virtue for Smith or a positive commitment for Rousseau. The second would show the difference between sympathy and pity as recognition mechanisms, and hence between the construction of social values in Smith and Rousseau. But these questions seem to overlook an aspect I believe can shed further light onto the radical difference between them and their projects. What I would like to examine here is what it is that justice describes, or in other words, of what is justice an attribute? I advance that, in spite of their coincidences, Smith and Rousseau ascribe justice to different entities so to speak. In Smith justice describes the individual while in Rousseau it is an institutional feature. Whereas in Smith justice emerges from the sympathetic process, in Rousseau it is a normative ideal that must be attained through the transformation of individual and society.

Warren Herold (Arkansas): Adam Smith and the Psychological Foundations of Contractualism

Abstract

In *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls introduced an account of justice grounded in the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. He defended his two famous principles of justice by arguing that they would be chosen from behind a "veil of ignorance" – i.e., by people ignorant of their positions in society, their personal characteristics, and so forth. Rawls hoped that his theory would provide an alternative to the classical utilitarian tradition, which he associated with the work of Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Bentham, and Sidgwick, among others. Years earlier, John Harsanyi developed an argument with a structure similar to Rawls's more famous account. Like Rawls, Harsanyi believed that the correct moral principles are those that would be chosen from behind a veil of ignorance. But whereas Rawls presented his theory as an alternative to the classical utilitarian tradition, Harsanyi used his to support it – going so far as to characterize his decision-theoretic utilitarian model of moral judgment as "a modern restatement of Adam Smith's theory of the impartially sympathetic observer." Though they agreed on little else, both Rawls and Harsanyi viewed Smith as an early utilitarian ideal observer theorist.

I present and defend a very different interpretation of Adam Smith's moral theory. Building on the work of Stephen Darwall and others, I show how Smith's accounts of sympathy and the impartial spectator support a set of normative principles quite unlike those endorsed by Bentham, Sidgwick, and Harsanyi, and surprisingly similar to those endorsed by Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, and other social contract theorists. Embedded within Smith's moral psychology is a commitment not to utilitarian moral principles, but to a normative conception of society as a community of free, independent, and mutually accountable equals, all working together to construct a shared evaluative perspective that is simultaneously respectful of and endorsable by all reasonable points of view. What we find in Smith is not a precursor to 20th-century ideal observer theory, but a sophisticated and empirically defensible moral psychology capable of supporting a contractualist account of moral judgment and motivation: a detailed and highly compelling description of the complex iterative process by which individuals can come to freely adopt and employ the aforementioned shared evaluative perspective.

It is ironic that Smith's moral philosophy has been criticized by Rawls and embraced by Harsanyi. It ought to have been the other way around.

Panel C *Smith and Rousseau*: Smith

Location: Fore Hall **Chair: Cian O'Driscoll (GU)**

Maria Pia Paganelli (Trinity, USA) We Are Not The Center of The Universe: The Role of Astronomy in the Development of Morality in Adam Smith

Abstract

This paper claims that Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments is deeply indebted to astronomical theories. Smith's interest and knowledge of astronomy are shown in his essay *The History of Astronomy*. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith claims that we develop morally by changing our perspective, which smoothes the arrogance of our self-love as we realize that we are not the center of the universe. The realization that we are not the center of the actual universe is achieved in a very similar way in Fontenelle's *Conversation on the Plurality of Worlds*. By changing perspective with their imagination, Fontenelle's characters also humble their arrogance realizing they are not the center of the universe. Smith's system seems therefore to be the application of astronomy to morality.

Barry Weingast (Stanford): Deriving "General Principles" in Adam Smith: The Ubiquity of Equilibrium and Comparative Statics Analysis throughout His Works

Abstract

This paper contributes to the debate over the unity in Adam Smith's corpus by emphasizing Smith's pervasive methodological approach based on an assumption of self-interest. Specifically, missing from the literature is an understanding that Smith consistently relies on *equilibrium* arguments to explain why a given pattern of economic, political, or social interaction is stable; and *comparative static* arguments to explain how a stable pattern changes. Many of his most powerful ideas rely on equilibrium and comparative static techniques. As we demonstrate, Smith's usage of these techniques includes his explanation of morality and benevolence; the political economics of development; the theory of languages; and his approach to law, politics, and government, such as the form of government, property rights, family structure, and virtue in his famous "four stages" theory of history. We close the paper by arguing that equilibrium and comparative statics analysis has significant implications for the contents of Smith's so-called "missing second book" on government, law, and jurisprudence.

Aino Lahdenranta (Jyvaskyla) Adam Smith on spontaneous propriety judgments

Abstract

In this paper, I develop a novel interpretation of propriety judgments in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and show the advantages of my interpretation compared to currently prevailing readings. Besides arguing for the advantages of the proposed view, I alleviate the apparent crudeness of Smith's account by considering the influence of Nicolas Malebranche. In particular, I suggest that Malebranche's notion of the self-justifying nature of passions constitutes a neglected key ingredient in Smith's understanding of human nature.

Smith maintains that the passions other people display naturally appear to us as having some degree of propriety or impropriety with respect to their object. However, moral sentiments definitive of propriety consist only of those approvals and disapprovals that we feel when we are in a spectator's position – that is, when we are observing someone else's situation without personal interests. According to my interpretation, 'the spontaneous judgment view', a spectator's approvals and disapprovals result from her present passion. If a spectator notices a correspondence between her own occurring passion and the observed person's passion, she instantaneously approves of the other's passion as proper. The spontaneous judgment view stands in contrast with various interpretations according to which spectator's approvals and disapprovals result from her imaginatively generated estimations concerning passions. I argue that although 'the deliberative judgment view' might imply a more plausible view of moral judgment it is not supported by the text and threatens to limit the scope of Smith's explanatory project.

I believe that propriety judgments must be understood in light of a psychological thesis that Smith adopts from Malebranche. This is the idea that any passion of our own seems suitable and proportioned to its object while we are experiencing it. Further, anyone experiencing a passion is bound to *extend* this inherent self-approval upon perceiving that someone else is affected by the same object in an exactly similar manner. My suggestion is that this goes for spectators alike. In fact, it seems to me that Smith's theory of the psychological configuration of moral experience is an attempt to build on this Malebranchean principle by teaming it up with the constant viewpoint provided by spectators and our tendency to form general rules.

Session 2 (1100-1230)

Panel A *Morality*: Imitation in Rousseau and Smith

Location: Humanity Lecture Theatre Chair: John Scott (RA)

Iago Ramos (Salamanca): Imagination, mémoire et appropriation chez Rousseau et Smith

Abstract

Les Lumières, comme nous le rappelle Adam Smith dans sa *Letter to the Edinburgh Review*, « [are] cultivated in some degree in almost every part of Europe », mais « it is in France and England only that it is cultivated with such success or reputation as to excite the attention of foreign nations », parce que c'est dans ces territoires que les Sciences échappent aux Académies et deviennent une affaire proprement publique et transformatrice. Smith n'a pas tort : c'est au cœur des débats publics empiristes que les Lumières ont fleuri, et non point grâce aux raisonnements en privé de quelque sage reclus. On a tendance à désigner les Lumières comme l'âge de la raison, mais ce qui caractérise véritablement cette époque ce sont les révolutions publiques – scientifiques, politiques et économiques – ayant pour origine un bouleversement des convictions épistémologiques et métaphysiques des hommes. Avec pour enjeu, un renouvellement du critère épistémologique qui doit désormais prendre en compte la diversité et la différence des individus. Ce renouvellement s'impose aussi sur le plan anthropologique, où l'animalité de l'homme n'est plus négociable mais dans lequel doit pouvoir s'exprimer la dimension morale et libre de notre existence.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau fait partie de ces auteurs du XVIII^{e} siècle qui se préoccupent fortement de cette issue anthropologique. Il nous propose un nouveau modèle d'homme, calqué traditionnellement sur les idées de liberté et perfectibilité. Je ne suis pas d'accord avec cette caractérisation et je vais défendre que ce qui est définitoire de l'homme rousseauiste c'est une entité particulière et une identité bâtie sur l'imagination et la mémoire qui rendent possible l'existence individuelle grâce à l'appropriation subjective de la réalité à partir de nos perceptions. Nous retrouvons aussi chez Smith ce mouvement à l'origine de la dimension morale de l'homme, dans son œuvre, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, où il nous parle de l'imagination comme étant la faculté d'associer la nécessité physique à la liberté morale pour produire nos décisions.

Que ces deux auteurs partagent des soucis communs à propos de l'imagination peut suggérer une influence directe – et il faudrait compter avec Hume –, mais je crois que la coïncidence tient plutôt à l'expression d'un contexte ontologique commun ; on retrouvera par exemple des opinions similaires dans l'*Encyclopédie*. Ce qui nous invite à revisiter l'âge dit de la raison comme âge de l'imagination.

Spiros Tegos (Crete): ***Courtoisie without court? Adam Smith's translation and reception by French 'Liberals'***

Abstract

Wealth of Nations's reception in France has attracted substantial scholarly attention. Yet the reception of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (*TMS*) is less debated, especially regarding republican ethos and 'middle class' manners. Even before French revolution, courtly politeness was rarely vindicated. In post-revolutionary context, once courtly civility has been definitely rebutted, the question remains: is it possible to *radically* disconnect manners from status? The enigma of a modern *courtoisie* without court haunts moderate Republicans such as Sophie de Grouchy [*Lettres sur la sympathie* (1798)] and Mme de Stael '*De la littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales'* (1800) and their source of inspiration resides in Adam Smith's political *and* moral philosophy mediated by Rousseau. In this paper I explore the nature of this Adam Smith-Rousseau cross reading by French proto-liberals in order for a moderate republican ethos to emerge.

Wei Wang (Chinese Academy of Social Science): Sound and imitation: A reexamination of Rousseau's theory of sign

Abstract

Rousseau's theory of sign (language and music), as a crucial and equivocal component of his philosophy, has evoked the attention of many critics, including Jacques Derrida who reckons Rousseau not only as the embracer par excellence of the classical model of metaphysics, but also as the founder of modern philosophy of "presence" and its avatar in the field of language, namely the structural linguistics. In order to reexamine justly the aporia (along with a reevaluation of Derrida's criticism), the essential work is to investigate the philosophical concept "imitation", and its rousseauist "pragmatics" elaborating a different understanding of the relationship between "sound" and "meaning". Nevertheless, the first focus of my analysis will be placed in Rousseau's treatment of visual experience, especially the painting, where I believe that he cuts off the connection between "see" and "speak", a classical economy of sign inherited from Plato and Aristotle. In this way, Rousseau proposes a "new imitation", which could be significantly found in music, a marvelous art form that throws constantly our souls in a "disposition", instead of representing or expressing an object. Rousseau replaces his new understanding in a network of differences with *imago* and *imaginatio*. It is not a pre-logical structure, but rather a multi-logical system adherent to its material supports. Through the analysis of Rousseau's idea about music, we could also see that Derrida's misunderstanding is rooted in his simple and unilateral reading of Rousseau's key concepts, such as soul, passion and existence, etc. Comparing his texts concerning music with his ideas about the botanical practice is another effective way to deepen our understanding of his theory of sign. Imitation is not a philosophical "metaphor" any more. Rousseau's theory of sign is also connected to his "anthropological" idea about the origin of language. I will clarify the difference between "son" and "voix", and its two types, which are quite essential for understanding the nature of language, and for dispelling the accepted appearance of arbitrariness between sound and meaning, signifying and signified, etc.

Panel B *Politics*: Smith on Justice and Freedom

Location: Room G466 Chair: Sandra Peart (IASS)

Jonathan Diesel (GMU): Two Superiors, Two Jural Relationships in Adam Smith

Abstract

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* Smith uses the noun *superior* in multiple ways. A comparative superior, such as Isaac Newton or Novak Djokovic, is one that is superior in a specific quality or characteristic; the rules of (commutative) justice apply equally to the comparative superior and the comparative inferior. But, Smith identifies another kind of superior, the jural superior, which he associates with "the laws of all civilized nations," "the civil magistrate," "the sovereign," and "a law-giver." Smith's "superior" passage suggests there are two jural relationships within his work. In addition to the equal-equal jural relationship, there is the superior-inferior jural relationship. I provide Smith's taxonomy of "superior" within *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Isaac Newton was a superior in science, but still the jural relationship he had with other scientists was the equal-equal relationship. The other kind of superior, the jural superior, has a jural relationship with others called the superior-inferior relationship—which may be thought of as the governor-governed relationship. The rules of justice apply equally in the equal-equal relationship but not in the superior-inferior relationship. Recognizing the uniqueness of the jural superior highlights the importance of liberty/justice as a central theme in Smith. I close my paper with some thoughts for further research on the jural superior topic such as how the jural superior relates to Smith's system of natural liberty and whether sympathy works well for one who acts as a jural superior.

Lisa Hill (Adelaide): Adam Smith's Politics: Social Science and Pragmatic Liberalism.

Abstract

In this paper I provide a new interpretation of Smith's political orientation and confront existing theories of his politics. I suggest that the debate about whether Smith was either a Whig or a Tory, conservative or progressive liberal misses the point that his political project was an exercise in social science rather than ideology. I argue that, while Smith was generally positive about commercial progress, he also had a pronounced conservative streak born, not of his allegiance to Tory-ism but of his desire for a social science-informed politics.

This does not mean that Smith was politically neutral, even though he seems to have seen himself that way. Objectively –and from the vantage point of hindsight– he occupies a place on the political spectrum that is best described as a kind of pragmatic liberalism. He is best classified as a pragmatic –rather than doctrinaire–liberal because he based his program, not on abstract foundations but on principles derived from practical observation.

I argue that the popular characterisation of Smith as a champion of negative liberty and 'the system of natural liberty' is reasonable but with three important qualifications: first, Smith is no high theorist of liberalism and his account of rights and liberties is rather unresolved, from a theoretical point of view, because constrained by practical and consequentialist considerations. Second, he admits that the system of natural liberty sometimes fails, making it necessary to violate some personal liberties for the sake of human flourishing. I show how and why in this paper and this necessarily entails a close study of his conservative tendencies. Third, his delineation and defence of the system of natural liberty is not borne of any desire to promote abstract liberal values like individualism, freedom and autonomy as ends in themselves but is a pragmatist's reaction to the most pressing political problems of his day, namely, political corruption, relentless war and interstate conflict, public debt, sub-optimal productivity levels and economic —and especially food—insecurity (caused largely by British imperialism); declining literacy rates and poor public health. He defends such values to the extent that they serve substantive ends and he readily abandons them when the ends demand it. In other words, he often violates negative liberty for the sake of *positive* liberty.

Daniel B. Klein (George Mason): Adam Smith's Multifaceted Justice

Abstract

Adam Smith uses the word justice and its cognates 382 times in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and 193 times in *The Wealth of Nations*. Does Smith confine his justice talk to commutative justice? The answer is no, not at all. Justice talk *beyond commutative justice* accounts for more than 50 percent of the justice talk in TMS and at least 25 percent in WN. In TMS (pp. 269-270), Smith distinguishes and describes three senses of justice, *commutative*, *distributive*, and a third a name for which he does not give but is here called *estimative*. This paper, firstly, departs from the view that Smith confined his justice talk to commutative justice; the paper suggests, rather, that Smith both practiced and affirmed justice talk beyond commutative justice. At the same time, it is clear that, for Smith, commutative justice is very special. It must be said that, overall, there is inconsistency or at least ambiguity or equivocation in Smith on the matter of talking justice beyond commutative justice, presumably reflecting his ambivalence or his own tacit distinctions. I offer interpretation of the three senses of justice. On my interpretation, estimative justice looms large, particularly in matters determined by "the superior," that is, the law-giver, the magistrate, the sovereign (TMS p. 81). I argue that Smith would denominate such matters, not in terms of distributive justice, but rather in terms of estimative justice (as well as commutative justice). The paper argues that going beyond commutative justice to see distributive justice is not going far enough, we need to see estimative justice as well, as something, which though "a-kin" to distributive justice, still is distinct from distributive justice.

Panel C *Smith and Rousseau*: Education and Virtue

Location: Fore Hall **Chair: Christopher J. Berry (GU)**

Gloria Vivenza (Verona): *Smith, Rousseau and Cato the Younger*.

Abstract

There has been, in recent years, a deepening interest in examining the possible relationship between Smith and Rousseau. The comparison between the two authors turns around the subject they had in common: commercial society, of which Smith was the advocate (though seeing its failures), and Rousseau, the most ruthless opponent. Smith's attitude towards the French author is ambiguous: he calls him both "ingenuous and eloquent" and "more capable of feeling strongly than of analysing accurately" – which is not exactly a compliment for whatever author. About the insulting epithet used by Smith in his correspondence with David Hume, we cannot forget that the latter had serious problems with Rousseau, and Smith was likely to be informed about them much better than ourselves.

However, since my field of research is about classical training and culture in the eighteenth century, I'll single out some classical topics dealt with by both authors: for instance Cato's suicide in Utica after Caesar's victory.

Smith drew especially from Seneca his description of Cato's heroic death; but if we examine all the passages where he deals with the Roman hero, we cannot say that he had a great opinion of him: he defines him as a "bottle companion" or "a party man" (endowed with "animosity"). How different from Rousseau's passionate peroration: "Ferons-nous cet affront à l'heroisme d'en refuser le titre à Caton d'Utique?" and also: "Caton (….) périt avec Rome et la liberté, parce qu'il fut déplacé dans son siècle; et le plus grand des hommes ne fit qu'étonner le monde qu'il aurait gouverné cinq cents ans plus tot". "Le plus grand des hommes": this is how Rousseau considered Cato.

Among the various descriptions of Cato's death transmitted by the classics, some details are worthy of note: for instance, the hero's concern for the safety of his friends; or his final reading of Plato's *Phaedo*, which caused in the literature a long-lasting connection between Cato and Socrates. Naturally there was a difference between a death sentence (Socrates had received just that), and Cato's voluntary suicide, which was a real choice between life and death. But we must recall that the classics had also a "frivolous" side in the eighteenth century: Addison's tragedy *Cato*, for instance, shows the two male children of the hero in love with the same woman, whereas the daughter Marcia yearns for the African king Juba.

Now, what did Adam Smith think about all this? We have mentioned Rousseau's unrestricted support of Cato's figure. To Rousseau's character, the uncompromising and inflexible attitude of Cato was entirely admirable. His expression (the hero "surprised the world he would have ruled 500 years before") means that Rousseau considered Cato as a man of the Roman "golden age": a Scaevola, a Cincinnatus, a Regulus. Smith seems on a different level: he did not approve of suicide, and where he admits of a nobility or superiority in Cato's character, he clearly draws it from Seneca – but the hints he himself devotes to the Roman's life and character are not quite or always positive.

Both authors, despite their numerous differences, feel in Cato a problematic figure; Smith clearly suggests that all eulogies somehow conceal the real man; Rousseau believes that Cato is an ill-adjusted person, a man who would have been suited to previous times, but unfit for his own century. In short, Smith judges out of place the legend, Rousseau the real man.

Patrick Cox (Georgia State): Rousseau's Favorite Educational Treatise in Relation to the *Emile*: Comparing and Contrasting the *Emile* and the *Republic*

Abstract

Rousseau's emphatic endorsement of Plato's educational theory in the *Republic* (Rousseau, *Emile*, Bloom translation, p. 40) suggests that a comparison of the two educational works might reveal substantial similarities. For Rousseau, however, "Public instruction no longer exists and can no longer exist" (p. 40). Whereas the *Republic* discusses the proper education for auxiliaries and for philosopher-rulers in the city, the *Emile* explains how to raise a man "uniquely for himself" (p. 41). To simplify this difference, Emile lives a private life, while the recipients of the educational program in the *Republic* are prepared for public, or political, life. As such, the *Emile* portrays the education of an individual pupil by an individual tutor, and the *Republic* presents the training, en masse, of all those who pass the vetting process at each stage of the guardian education (Plato, *Republic*, 503e); the former is devoid of superfluity and optimally efficient for the pupil, which accounts for the difficulty in actually providing such an education, while the latter teaches what is beneficial to the group as a whole, which is not always precisely at the individual's intellectual level.

This paper argues that, like the *Republic*, the *Emile* contains various stages of physical, music, and other forms of education; however, these types of education often differ in their means and in their ends. Moreover, there are two main types of education in the *Republic* – that of the auxiliaries and that of the philosopher-rulers; high standards are set for each class but especially for the philosopher-rulers (376c), whereas Rousseau is turning an average human being into the rarest of persons (p. 52). Rousseau's means of educating is negative, so as to preserve Emile's natural goodness (p. 93), and is adaptive to the pupil's curiosities (p. 192); the *Republic* aims to redirect the souls of the auxiliaries and of the philosopher-rulers towards the proper objects (*Republic*, 518d), and stories and myths are imposed (377a) in contradiction to Rousseau's preference for ignorance over false ideas (p. 102). Rousseau's approach is sensitive to authority's role, as the pupil must not believe that other wills are imposed on his own; in the music education, Plato is comfortable with including stories about the gods, who have an authoritative role and serve as models of behavior (377d-378a). In addition, whereas Plato gives men and women a similar education (451d-452b), Rousseau selects a male child as a pupil and rejects intense physical education for women (p. 366).

Tabitha Baker (Warwick): Julie's Garden and the Impartial Spectator: an examination of Smithean themes in Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse*

Abstract

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith have traditionally been held as divergent contemporaries of the Enlightenment with irreconcilable ideologies. Yet an examination of their respective discourses (particularly *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*, *Du Contrat Social* and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*) reveals a striking similarity between certain aspects of their thought; as important commentators of modern commercial society, we can see that both are equally concerned with the threat that such a society posed to morality. In this paper I will argue that it is through Rousseau's fiction that the complicated relationship between the two thinkers' thought can be most evidently sourced, suggesting that Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse* can be seen as inherently Smithean in nature due to the way in which the theme of morality is treated.

In particular, this paper will show how the Smithean aspects of *La Nouvelle Héloïse* can be most acutely seen in the motif of the eighteenth-century English landscape garden. It is in this space that Rousseau's novel reflects Smith's principles of arriving at moral behaviour and true virtue, and it is here that Rousseau and Smith's theories seem to be reconciled in order to produce a blended social model in which Smith provides responses to Rousseau's failed utopia. Through an examination of *La Nouvelle Héloïse* alongside Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* it will become apparent that the symbol of the landscape garden in Rousseau's novel is an experimental setting in which Rousseau and Smith's theories are merged. An analysis of the Smithean concepts of the 'impartial spectator' and 'society of strangers' will demonstrate how these notions are important to understanding how moral behaviour is appropriated within the public and private garden; this will subsequently be followed by an exploration of how vanity is encouraged in the public garden through eliciting the desire to gain the approbation of others, and how Rousseau attempts to negate such behaviour through the creation of the private garden. An exploration of proximity and distance in the garden will conclude my paper where I will demonstrate how Smith's thoughts on moral regulation are distorted by Rousseau in *La Nouvelle Héloïse* and necessitate the failure of Rousseau's vision of utopian society.

Session 3 (1330-1500)

Panel A *Morality*: Smith and Rousseau on Spectatorship

Location: Humanity Lecture Theatre Chair: Zev Trachtenberg (RA)

Adam Schoene (Cornell): Sentimental Conviction: Rousseau's Apologia and the Impartial Spectator

Abstract: "The humiliating role of my own defense is too much beneath me, too unworthy of the feelings that inspire me for me to enjoy undertaking it […]," laments Rousseau, "but I could not examine the public's behavior regarding me without viewing myself in the most deplorable and cruel position in the world." These introductory dirges to Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues evoke the painful and laborious undertaking "Rousseau" must endure in adopting the perspective of his most incendiary detractors to unveil the true nature of "Jean-Jacques," false victim of a universally entrenched conspiracy. Like Rousseau in the Dialogues, Adam Smith employs a splitting of the self in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: "When I endeavor to examine my own conduct, when I endeavor to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that in all such cases I divide myself, as it were, into two persons, and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged […]."

While Rousseau and Smith have frequently been juxtaposed in opposing stances regarding pity and sympathy or commercial society, recent scholarship has drawn them into more nuanced dialogue to reveal certain strains of resonance in their thought. I will continue this conversation by reading Dialogues protagonist "Rousseau's" plea to "the Frenchman" for an unprejudiced witness in discourse with Smith's conception of the impartial spectator, in which satisfaction is derived from sympathy with the pleasure or pain of another, conveying a shared sentimental conviction. The Dialogues disclose Rousseau's intense yearning for justice born from his own experience fraught with censure, exile and alienation, and while Smith's impartial spectator may appear to Rousseau, as Charles Griswold has suggested, like a character in a narrative, whereas human interaction is characterized by a mutual "unnarratability," might there yet be import to this autobiographical fiction that serves as a defense of Rousseau's system?

Christopher Bertram (Bristol): Morality and the opinion of others

Abstract

Both Rousseau and Smith suggest that there is an intimate relationship between morality and our need to respond to the opinion of others. For Rousseau, though, this psychological need has standardly been given a negative valence. From the birth of amour propre in the first communities to the spectacle of the "European Minister" later in the Second Discourse, together with other texts, such as Emile, Rousseau's emphasis is usually on the way in which the opinion of others has a corrupting effect on the individual, resulting in a loss of authenticity. Nevertheless, Rousseau also sees amour propre as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for truly moral conduct. Adam Smith, particularly in part 3 of Moral Sentiments also emphasises the moralizing effects on individuals of the gaze of others and makes this central to his theory of morality via the idea of the impartial spectator. The paper will explore parallels between Rousseau's and Smith's moral psychology whilst also noting a deep division concerning the content of morality with its origins in the difference between Rousseau's contractualism and Smith's use of the impartial spectator. This discussion will also take account of Diderot's contractualism and of the modern reprise of the same divide in debates between Rawlsians and Amartya Sen.

John McHugh (Denison): Pursuing Sympathy without Vanity: Reading Smith's Attack on Rousseau through his Attack on Mandeville

Abstract

My goal in this paper is to contribute to the development of the now prominent view that Smith took Rousseau to be one of his main interlocutors. I attempt to do so by paying careful attention to Smith's explicit TMS critique of Mandeville; given the evident connection in Smith's thinking between the two philosophers, this critique can plausibly be treated as an approximate critique of Rousseau. Thus, I try to reconstruct Smith's philosophical attitude towards Rousseau almost solely on the basis of the TMS passages on Mandeville. In the first section of the paper, I flesh out the position on human nature and human sociality that Smith attributes to both Mandeville and Rousseau. In the second section, I explicate Smith's explicit response to Mandeville's version of this position. In the third section, I attempt to reconstruct a Smithian response to Rousseau on the basis of this response to Mandeville. Though the paper aims to focus primarily on that response, fully understanding it requires reference to Smith's sympathy-based account of approval. Invoking this feature of Smith's moral psychology, I ultimately argue that his disagreement with Rousseau can be understood as centering on the very nature of our concern with winning sympathy from others. My claim is that we should understand the sincere love of virtue, to which Smith appeals in response to Mandeville's reduction of such motives to vanity, in terms of a non-egocentric way of loving sympathy that Smith would charge Rousseau with overlooking. The paper closes with two brief reflections on how this reading might impact the ongoing project of clarifying the relationship between Smith and Rousseau. This reading sets us the task of explaining how it fits with Smith's proposed solutions to the problems with commercial society that Rousseau diagnoses, and it sets us the task of investigating how Smith's non-egocentric-sympathy-based conception of the love of virtue relates to Rousseau's own solution—i.e. the concept of the general will—with respect to each's broad normative orientation and concrete, first-order ethical and political implications.

Panel B *Politics*: Smith on Political Economy

Location: Room G466 Chair: Michelle Schwarze (IASS)

Edward Middleton (George Mason): Projectors as Men of System: Entangled Political Economy in Adam Smith's Theory of Credit Markets

Abstract

Despite Adam Smith's reputation as a champion of free markets, modern scholarship rightly recognizes the many exceptions he makes in *Wealth of Nations* advocating government interventions. Of particular significance are the interventions into the British monetary systems and the regulation of interest rates. Smith's rationale, as it always is in *Wealth of Nations*, is the improvement of the general welfare of those living within the system; in this case, he sought to protect the public from the infamous "prodigals and projectors". Professional criticism of his position began during the last years of his life, with its strongest expression in Jeremy Bentham's *Defense of Usury;* Smith passed before writing an explicit response. For the last 200 years scholarship has considered Bentham's the final word in their exchange, and has adopted his apparent narrow definition of projector *qua* entrepreneur when revisiting Smith's original claims. In this paper I examine the linguistic evolution of "projector" from the early 17th century onward and find the narrow definition anachronistic applied to a reading of Smith: entrepreneurship was only one of a variety of characteristics of the 17th and 18th century projector. Revisiting the usury passages in the Wealth of Nations with the broader context in mind suggests that Smith's projectors were men of system, under-capitalized, politically connected, and bent on large-scale reform: a non-binding interest rate price ceiling excludes from the credit market investments taken with the expectation of government bailout in the case of failure rather than discourages high-risk investment in general. Smith believed usury laws act as a prophylactic against investments which become too connected to fail.

Donald Brand (Holy Cross): Adam Smith and Usury Laws

Abstract

Freeing prices from state control was an essential element in Adam Smith's attack on Mercantilism. One would have anticipated that the embrace of market prices over administered state prices would have extended to interest rates as well as prices of other commodities, but this was not entirely the case. In The Wealth of Nations Smith defended usury laws that would have set a state-mandated maximum on interest rates. Smith thus seemingly defends a medieval practice rooted in a scriptural prohibitions against charging interest on money loaned. My paper will explore Smith's reasons for retaining usury laws in seeming contradiction to the logic of his larger project of political economy. Is this simply a failure to think through the implications of a free market economy?

Smith seems to advocate a limit on interest rates to restrict "prodigals and projectors" from gaining access to capital for risky, speculative ventures, but this does not explain why Smith concluded that the market would not establish an appropriate risk premium for speculative ventures. Jeremy Bentham, an admirer of Smith, took issue with Smith on this issue in a work entitled *In Defense of Usury*, concluding that the market would provide a mechanism for properly pricing risk. One of the letters in the work was explicitly addressed to Smith, yet, despite evidence that Smith read and appreciated to force of Bentham's arguments, Smith refused to alter his argument in subsequent editions of *The Wealth of Nations.* I will explore the relationship of the ban on usurious rates with the treatment of greed as a vice in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.* I will suggest that the move to a political economy based on the pursuit of self-interest presupposed limits on self-interest defined in the ethical society described in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Specifically, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* retained a distinction between forms of acquisitiveness that promoted socially beneficent forms of economic growth and extreme, morally objectionable forms of acquisitiveness that could harm society. Smith never embraced Gordon Gekko's aphorism that "Greed is good," and this helps us to understand his retention of laws banning usury.

Reinhard Schumacher (Potsdam): Adam Smith and the Patterns of Foreign Trade: The Absence of an International Division of Labour in Smith's Theory

Abstract

Adam Smith is commonly referred to as one of the first who understood foreign trade in terms of an international division of labour, whereby each country specialises in the production of certain goods. It is argued that he made a strong case for foreign trade on this basis. In this article, I will, in contrast, show that Smith does not think of foreign trade in terms of an international division of labour. Economic progress rather than international trade determines domestic production structures. Apart from domestic development, international trade patterns are affected by transport costs, geographical factors as well as producer and consumer preferences. In Smith's theory, countries will not specialise but rather produce similar goods. International trade does affect the division of labour, but in a mechanical, not territorial sense. Smith theory assumes that trade will take place mainly between developed nations and in sophisticated manufactured commodities.

Session 4 (1530-1700)

Panel A *Morality*: Smith on Moral Judgement

Location: Humanity Lecture Theatre Chair: Fonna Forman (IASS)

Antonino Falduto (Halle-Wittenberg): Adam Smith's Moral Decision-Making Process

Abstract

In my paper, I aim to explore the process of making moral judgments according to Adam Smith, as he describes it in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. I argue that we can make sense of the decision-making process in moral cases only if we refer to the complete moral psychological account of the faculties of the human mind that Smith presents in this work.

In order to illustrate my thesis, I first describe the concept of sympathy as a faculty. In this regard, I argue in the first place that sympathy enables the superficial perception of an agent's state of mind and, subsequently, allows for an appropriate degree of empathy with the sentiments both of the perceived agent and of the addressee of the action. Second, I distinguish between the faculty of understanding, which allows us to obtain an informed and well-founded cognition of the action, and the faculty of imagination, which allows us to depict the situation in which the agent is situated. The activation of these two faculties allows for a new configuration of the faculty of feeling: the agent now appropriately sympathizes and the faculty of feeling evokes a morally relevant state of mind. In the third moment of my argument, I analyse sympathy not only as a faculty but also as a realised state of mind. This is the actual sentiment, through which we can correctly judge the emotional reactions both of the perceived agent and of the addressee of the action. In this third section, the analysis of the faculty of choice, grounded on the realised sentiment of moral sympathy, constitutes the key moment of my argument.

This analysis of the faculties allows me to clarify Adam Smith's account of the human mind and its centrality in the context of his moral-psychological theory of decision-making. With my paper, I intend to shed some light on Smith's moral psychology and to contextualize sympathy as moral feeling in the context of the faculties.

Scott Drylie (GMU): Distant Learner or Campus Resident? The Education of the Impartial Spectator

Abstract:

In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* Adam Smith denied the need for benevolence and universal moral truths to sustain a social order. Emotionally governed people of "middling" morality could achieve unifying moral standards through their inherent sociability, their urge to sympathetically imagine another's situation, and their willingness to submit themselves to the conscious-like figure called the "impartial spectator." But a contemporary reader must ask whether Smith's device of the impartial spectator actually provides guidance today for culturally diverse associations which likely exceed what Smith was imagining. Fonna Forman asks a practical question: What actual "resources" does Smith provide to achieve impartiality? She concludes that the figure of the impartial spectator cannot escape its culturally rooted origins. Our capacity for diverse association is limited. The primary purpose of the current paper is to look beyond the enigmatic figure of the impartial spectator, and to reassess – in an effort to meet Forman's standard – whether Smith offers any concrete and credible process to achieve greater impartiality. I argue that Smith describes his middling moral agents with a great variability that does justice to his endeavor to empirically capture the human condition. The descriptions hint at histories of timely decisions, catalytic circumstances, habit, and luck. The descriptions also suggest the importance of interactive effects between the passions. Pathways of moral development reveal themselves. I provide a detailed interpretation of particular pathways made possible by way of "the cool hours" of remote moral contemplation. I argue that the cool hours permit a different mode of sympathy that benefits from a more expansive type of sympathetic imagination. Despite Smith's caution regarding abstraction and isolation, the cool hours figure into Smith's conception of what it means to live a fully moral and social life. In the near and far, hot and cool, Smith portrays a discursive, oscillating, habituating process for building the delicacy of sentiment and the strength of self-command necessary to expand impartiality. However, my analysis of the cool hours also brings into stark relief how pathways of moral development may meander dangerously into the cool reason of philosophy. The extra leisure of modernity is a blessing and a curse. Smith's aspirational side is a cautious one. I end with a Smithian response of caution toward today's agendas of multicultural moral education and toward the cosmopolitan demands for greater understanding of distant peoples.

Lauren Kopatjic (Harvard): "Sentimentalizing" Self-Command: Adam Smith's New Take on an Old Virtue

Abstract

In their introduction to Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (TMS), D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie claim that that "Stoic philosophy is the primary influence on Smith's ethical thought," and that Smith's virtue of self-command "is distinctively Stoic" (1982). In this paper, I join other recent scholars who have re-examined the case for Smith's purported Stoicism, focusing on the claim about self-command. I contend that we should not saddle Smith with a commitment to a Stoic virtue that would be in serious tension with his greater commitment to sentimentalism. I then argue that Smith's conception of self-command grows out of his sentimentalism and is not in conflict with his sentimentalist commitments.

In the first part of the paper, I discuss the Stoic conception of self-command and the historical prevalence of rationalist models of self-command. In the second part of the paper, I describe two significant ways in which Smith breaks with this rationalist tradition and "sentimentalizes" self-command. First, I explain Smith's claim that self-command is founded on "our sensibility to the feelings of others" (TMS III.3.34), showing how it develops from the workings of sympathy and the basic spectator-agent interaction. Second, I examine Smith's critique of Stoic "apathy" in TMS III.3, arguing that this discussion reveals that Smith's self-command tends toward an increase in sensibility and sensitivity. Finally, I consider how Smith's "sentimentalized" self-command is capable of fulfilling the role he explicitly assigns to it, that of enabling moral action. I argue that, for Smith, the impartial spectator serves as the standard for moral conduct and guides our efforts at self-command, allowing us to see when we are swayed by partial concerns and when we should restrain those partial passions and act for the sake of others. Our love of praiseworthiness and nobility of conduct, combined with our desire for the approval of the impartial spectator, give us a powerful motive for commanding even the strongest, most selfish passions. I conclude by claiming that by seeing how Smith's self-command differs from Stoic self-command, we can also see a major difference between Smith's view and any view that takes self-control to involve *reason* controlling, harnessing, or otherwise governing the passions. In Smith's view, sentiment does the work of governing sentiment, not reason.

Panel B *Politics*: Commercial Society

Location: Room G466 Chair: Ourida Mostefai (RA)

Glory Liu (Stanford): Material Wealth and Moral Corruption: Reinterpreting the "paradox of commercial society" in the works of Adam Smith

Abstract

This paper critically assesses notions of Smith's alleged "egalitarianism" in light of his support for free markets. One longstanding argument in favor of the egalitarian reading of Smith, for example, is that free markets would provide a more just distribution of goods to the poor without compromising the property rights of the rich. I argue that this *desideratum* in favor of greater economic equality ought to be read as just one dimension of Smith's response to the problem of the "paradox of commercial society:" not only was there the possibility of poverty amidst plenty, but there was also the problem that even if men could be made better of materially, they might be worse of morally. The division of labor and "distinction of ranks" operated on an assumption that individual moral sentiments were "corrupted," and that the pursuit of wealth over virtue, sympathy with the rich and neglect of the poor kept men working to generate wealth that made everyone better off. Understanding this relationship between Smith's depiction of the "corruption of moral sentiments" in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* as both a natural cause and consequence of commercial society, therefore, provides a uniquely Smithian response to the question, "To what extent are material inequalities objectionable?" Ultimately, I suggest that Smith's positive conception of commercial society, founded on an assumption of inequality of material outcomes, reveals strong commitment to equal standing in spite of material inequality.

Byron Davies (Harvard): The Insult in Not Being Believed: Rousseau and Adam Smith.

Abstract

In this paper, I am interested in what are, to my mind, under-explored moments in Rousseau's and Adam Smith's writings in which each philosopher presents speech, and particularly testimony, as manifestations of the desire for others' recognition.

I will begin by summarizing Rousseau's understanding of *amour-propre*, and especially the way in which, as I read Rousseau, desiring another's recognition involves acknowledging that other in her dimension as a freedom. I will then turn to Rousseau's fullest exploration of speech, the *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, and Rousseau's characterization of vocal speech as an expression of our passional or affective natures. I will argue that in this essay Rousseau is gesturing at the way in which speech, and especially what we would today call the illocutionary dimension of speech, involves desiring the recognition of an audience. And since the characteristic response to the thwarting of *amour-propre* is insult, this understanding of Rousseau should put in context the feeling of insult appropriate upon having one's speech act rejected.

But I also want to draw our attention to some ways in which having one's speech act rejected is different from other instances of having one's *amour-propre* thwarted: for example, when one is denied the love that one seeks. In addressing an audience, we expect that the audience owes us a response; and when the expected response is not forthcoming, it is easier to see ourselves as wronged, or as subject to an injustice, than, say, when our love has not been reciprocated. And I think it is observations of this sort that motivate Adam Smith, whose *Theory of Moral Sentiments* was influenced by Rousseau, to explore responses, such as gratitude, that we can think of ourselves as *owed*, especially in the context of our addressing a second person, but whose satisfactoriness consists in its being an expression of the other's freedom: that is, in its not being forced. And I will argue that this character of second-personal exchanges can account for the peculiar frustration of a speaker whose testimony has been rejected, and that it can account for Smith's interest in questions about testimony, particularly his assertion, toward the end of the last edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, that "It is always mortifying not to be believed."

Fabien Delmotte (Paris West Nanterre La Defense): The question of emancipation: Adam Smith and Rousseau

Abstract

In his *History of economic analysis*, Schumpeter mentions the "social sympathies" of Adam Smith and detects a "judiciously diluted Rousseauism" in the equalitarian tendency of *The Wealth of Nations*. Schumpeter sees it as one of the expressions of the "fashion" of that time, in relation to his idea that the success of this book would be partly explained by Smith's positioning, generally "thoroughly in sympathy with the humors of his time", for example on the issue of free trade. However, this presentation doesn't help to understand the originality of Smith's endeavour to integrate and discuss these various and seemingly contradictory influences. One of the interesting things about *The Wealth of Nations* is that it actually sheds new light on the nature and role of emancipation in modern history. By appearing, not without nuances, to defend the idea that the increasingly central position of economic development turns out to be coherent with freedom and equality claims, in whose name Rousseau differently condemned this dimension of modernity, Smith still intellectually challenges us. This doesn't eliminate the interest of Rousseau's philosophy, but, on the contrary, makes their "dialogue" a necessary step to discuss contemporary issues, such as understanding "neoliberal" capitalism, individualism or the meaning of democracy.

This contribution will therefore first emphasize how the egalitarian orientation of their thought, their concerns about the living conditions of the people and about political freedom can in particular move Smith closer to Rousseau, in contrast, for example, to physiocrats, who defend free trade. Nevertheless, we'll also have to point out how the understanding of the emancipatory dynamic of modernity by Smith, which seems widely oriented towards the economic abundance and the virtuous logic of the market, differs from Rousseau's social and political conceptions. This is especially the case when he considers the possibility of institutions fostering the existence of an assembled people concerned with the common good. However, it is important not to caricature and oversimplify this opposition. That's why we'll have to question the place and the meaning attributed by the two authors to individual freedom, in front, for instance, of the economic dependency in commercial society or division of labour issues. This will make it possible to avoid overly simplistic oppositions between individualism on the one hand and collective political will on the other hand, which fail to understand the importance of these autors, even today, in considerations of the question of emancipation.

Panel C *Smith and Rousseau*: Rousseau

Location: Fore Hall **Chair: Michael O'Dea (RA)**

Mauro Dela Bandera Arco Junior (USP Brazil): Rousseau's anthropology in the *Essai sur l'origine des langues*

Abstract

The anthropological principle that guides Rousseau's reflections in many of his works can be expressed as follows: the pressure of necessity varies according to the place and, depending on its intensity on the formation of socialization, it results in different types of passions and languages. There is a direct correlation between the degree of need, the state of culture, the kind of feelings or ideas expressed by the language and the sound substance of the language itself.

In the pages of his *Essai sur l'origine des langues,* Rousseau demonstrates that the emergence of speech cannot be explained resorting to a single and homogeneous origin. On the contrary: this question admits only singular responses, since it involves the analysis of men's relationship with their living conditions. Livelihoods directly influence men's mutual exchanges; therefore, also the formation of their behaviors, their passions and their languages. These influences, which represent a unique process within each society, can be understood only when referred to the comprehensive analysis of a particular historical situation, to all the aspects of men's lifestyle and – last but not least – to the effective relations between man and nature that, in the author's view, necessarily pass through the mediation of other men.

Thus, the ways in which the processes of socialization originate from natural conditions or circumstances are crucial to the knowledge of men and to the structuring of languages. But how does this happen? How the so-called external factors model differences in men's behavior, in their passions and in the structure of languages? Our speech will deal with such questions.

Thiago Vargas (USP Brazil): Rousseau's critique of political economy

Abstract

Our purpose is to outline considerations concerning Rousseau's economic thought, particularly those regarding the principle of the division of labour. To that end, the paper intends to examine the role of work (*travail*) and commerce in *Émile's* education. Teaching labours that will allow Émile to become self-sufficient and to keep him away from idleness are issues that occupy an important place in the preceptor's concerns: if the pupil must be useful to the society in which he will choose to live, and labour being an inescapable duty for man in society, a successful education shall start the pupil in a great diversity of crafts (*métiers*), as many as are needed so that his autonomy is ensured. However, these lessons are not about instructing Émile in any kind of *métiers*: his independence is assured by the work of his hands, activity that, according to Rousseau, is the closest to humankind natural conditions. By teaching the pupil different forms of labour, enabling him to acquire skills and allowing him to be independent, Rousseau also prevents his pupil from being exposed to the harms caused by the social division of labour. Finally, I shall present some elements of the critique of the division of labour in *Émile,* in which Rousseau resumes previous remarks he had made in his *Second Discourse*.

Antoine Serge Bell (Yaounde 1 Cameroun): Jean-Jacques Rousseau Et La Science Économique De Son Temps

Abstract

La science économique de l'époque de Rousseau est principalement dominée par trois écoles de pensées. Les deux premières, à savoir le mercantilisme et la physiocratie, émergent dès le XVIe siècle. Animé par des penseurs comme Jean-Baptiste Colbert, John Locke, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, le mercantilisme insiste sur l'idée que la principale source d'enrichissement de la nation est l'argent et l'or qu'il importe pour ce fait d'accumuler. Contrairement à cette école de pensée, la physiocratie ou système de l'agriculture, dont le principal théoricien est François Quesnay, estime que l'agriculture est sinon la seule, du moins la principale source d'enrichissement de la nation.

Malgré leurs divergences, ces écoles de pensées s'accordent sur l'idée que le principal objet de l'économie politique est l'enrichissement de la nation. C'est cette thèse majeure que Rousseau critique dans son *Discours sur l'économie politique*, et plus généralement dans la plupart de ses ouvrages philosophiques.

Élaboré dans la deuxième moitié du XVIIIème siècle, le libéralisme économique d'Adam Smith se situe en rupture de référence avec non seulement le mercantilisme et la physiocratie, mais aussi avec la philosophie politique de Rousseau, en ceci que pour cet auteur, la nation est non pas une catégorie politique, comme c'était le cas chez Rousseau, mais un espace économique d'échanges. En étudiant ainsi les principales catégories de l'économie, Smith élabore les concepts majeurs de l'économie politique moderne. Ceci ne problématise-t-il pas l'approche rousseauiste de l'économie politique qui insiste sur la dimension politique de l'économie ? En effet si, contrairement aux mercantilistes, aux physiocrates et aux libéraux dont Smith en la figure de proue, Rousseau définit l'économie politique comme le gouvernement légitime de l'État, c'est-à-dire la bonne gestion politique des personnes et des biens conformément à la volonté générale, il reste cependant à déterminer la pertinence de ce discours politique sur l'économie dans un contexte où la science économique tend de plus en plus à s'autonomiser. En quoi la pensée politique de Rousseau peut-elle alors constituer une critique de l'économisme et du libéralisme modernes ?

Après avoir analysé la critique rousseauiste de l'économie politique de son temps et son dépassement par Smith, cette modeste réflexion va s'attarder sur l'originalité et l'actualité de cette critique rousseauiste de l'économie politique.

22nd July

Session 5 (0900-1030)

Panel A: The Moral Sentiments

Location: Fore Hall **Chair: Alexander Broadie (GU)**

Michael Schleeter (Pacific Lutheran): Adam Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the Cultivation of Moral Sentiments

Abstract

In his *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (*WON*), Adam Smith advanced the idea that self-interest or "the desire of bettering our condition" has the potential to contribute to the general goods of both widespread prosperity and what he called "perfect equality" provided that it is tempered by natural sympathy and social virtue so that it does not lead us to violate the liberty of others and thereby the organizing principle of the marketplace. However, Smith also observed, both in his *WON* and in his earlier *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (*TMS*), that the marketplace itself has the potential to contribute to the erosion of both natural sympathy and social virtue. For example, in *TMS*, he argued that, insofar as the marketplace gives rise to material inequalities, it has the potential to occasion the expression of our disposition to favor the rich over the poor, which is "the greatest and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments." And, in *WON*, he argued that, insofar as the marketplace gives rise to a refined division of labor, it has the potential to cause us to become "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become" and thus to lose our "intellectual, social and martial virtues." Ultimately, Smith suggested that these negative effects can and should be mitigated through a process of proper—and, importantly, public—eduction.

In this paper, I want to accomplish two main tasks. First, I want to outline Smith's views on the marketplace and its potential to contribute to the erosion of both natural sympathy and social virtue as well as his suggestions for how these negative effects can and should be mitigated. Second, I want to supplement Smith's suggestions for the latter by contrasting his views on sympathy and virtue with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's views on compassion and virtue as they are developed in his *Emile or On Education*. In particular, I want to supplement Smith's suggestions by contrasting his view that self-interest must be *tempered* by sympathy and virtue with Rousseau's view that self-interest or, more precisely, *amour-propre* must be *sublimated* into compassion and virtue through a process of careful habituation, and then by indicating how Rousseau's view on the latter might impact Smith's vision of proper education.

Jonathan Jacobs (John Jay-CUNY): Adam Smith on Resentment and Gratitude: The Moral Psychology of Justice and Civility

Abstract

Smith argues that resentment and gratitude are fundamental moral sentiments. They have a kind of basicness as responses to desert, shaping human beings' regard for and treatment of each other, both positively and negatively. A striking element of Smith's view is the moral role he attributes to resentment. It is not inherently or always a 'toxic' or morally dubious sentiment, and it has a crucial role in the durable concern to see that justice is done. Smith says of resentment, "It is the safeguard of justice and the security of innocence." (*TMS*, II.ii.I.4) No doubt, there are ways in which resentment—as a sentiment, an attitude, and a motive—can be morally discreditable and harmful. It is widely held that resentment is morally suspect for that reason. Yet, Smith's view is not that resentment can be tamed, morally domesticated, somehow contained and limited in the harm it does. He argued that it has a significant role in the support of justice, in a way that suggests that we could be badly off without it. Indeed, it is interesting to consider what would be lost if no one ever felt resentment on our behalf. In Smith's view proper resentment reflects acknowledgement of persons as agents capable of acting for reasons and understanding the wrongness of their wrong actions, and it reflects concern for the victim of injustice. Thus, in important ways resentment can reflect respect for persons as responsible moral agents, with a distinctive standing as participants in the moral community.

Gratitude, of course, is less problematic as a moral sentiment though Smith's view of its basicness merits close examination. Indeed, it is plausible to interpret gratitude and resentment as *fundamental* sentiments, shaping crucially important forms of mutual regard. I argue that their importance to how individuals regard and treat each other is not confined to justice; in fact, they are also crucial to the overall civility of civil society. This claim is explicated *via* reflection on Smith's understanding of resentment and gratitude, as shaped by his conceptions of sympathy, imagination, sociability, and the impartial spectator. His view provides rich, plausible, and illuminating moral-psychological resources, especially for the context of a broadly liberal democratic political order and a dynamic, open civil society.

Benoit Walraevens (Caen) & Clare Pignol (Paris I PHARE): Rousseau and Smith on Envy in Commercial Societies

Rousseau and Smith seem to share a common and obvious conception of envy, based on a suffering coming from other's happiness, pleasure or wealth. Compared to other's social sentiments, envy is opposite both to Rousseau's pity and Smith's sympathy and both of them see envy as an asocial passion. Nevertheless, they don't ascribe to envy a similar importance, neither in their anthropology nor in their analysis of market society.

Both also share the idea that the progress of society leads to an increase in inequalities. But this rise for Rousseau goes along with a rise of comparison, *amour-propre* (self-liking), rivalry and actually envy. It explains the false social contract and results in unhappiness and dishonesty. Smith's story is quite different, even though he shares with Rousseau a common conception of the origin of government: for both of them, a state's *raison d'être* is to protect the rich from the envy of the poor. But we must add immediately that, for Rousseau, the state concerned here is not the one built on the general will but the one that appears with the false social contract. Moreover, for Smith, the progress of wealth, though unequal, gives rise to a process of emulation founded on the disinterested and non-envious (though corrupting) admiration people have for the rich and powerful. This natural sympathy for the wealthy and the great, Smith adds, is responsible for the stability and order of society.

Why is it that Rousseau and Smith, starting from seemingly common notions of envy and the rise of inequalities in society, reached so different, not to say antagonistic conclusions about the place of envy in advanced, commercial societies?

In order to understand why wealth gets the sympathy and approbation of the spectators in Smith while it makes them envious in Rousseau, we conjecture that the key of their disagreement could lie in their respective analysis of the genesis of our feelings and sentiments toward others (sympathy, pity and envy) which are built on specific processes of putting oneself in others' place. Sympathy in Smith is based on an identification process of which envy is nothing but an exception. The epistemological status of envy is not specified and the principle of comparison is not added to the principles of explanation of people's behaviour. That being said, this identification process, Smith concedes, is always imperfect: we never truly become the other person with which we try to sympathise. The possibility of envy may be found in this irremediable gap between oneself and the other(s). In Rousseau's thought, the relationship to others is made of both identification and comparison, the latter working differently depending on whether it gives rise to pity or to envy.

We further argue that the missing link between Smith and Rousseau on this issue may be Hume. Indeed, the latter describes envy as "a kind of pity reverst" (THN, 2.2.8.9) but, in opposition to Smith, he extensively studied the principle of comparison, at the root of envy. Besides, Hume ascribes to the principle of comparison the same degree of generality than that of sympathy. Hume's analysis of human nature thus creates a bridge between Smith and Rousseau on the place of envy in commercial societies.

Panel B: Smith and Rousseau on Government

Location: Room G466 Chair: Christopher J. Berry (GU)

Jason Neidleman (La Verne): Left to their own devices: Smith and Rousseau on Public Opinion and the Role of the State

Abstract

This paper explores the role of the state in the formation of public opinion in the works of Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. While both thinkers recognize the urgency of this endeavor, both are likewise troubled by its seeming incompatibility with the principles of personal liberty and popular sovereignty. Enlightenment models of political legitimacy presuppose that the relationship between public opinion and governance moves from the former to latter, as the sovereign people embody their will in public policy. And yet Smith and Rousseau—the latter far more than the former—acknowledge the necessity of the inverse as well. That is, they envision a role for the government in the process of opinion formation. Smith, for example, describes "management and persuasion" as the "easiest and the safest instruments of government," while Rousseau identifies the "talent of a leader" as the ability to "disguise his power to make it less odious" or, famously, "to persuade without convincing." Likewise, both Smith and Rousseau recognize the dangers of a state-sponsored project of opinion formation. Rousseau supported such a project, while at the same time seeming to reject the premises on which it could be justified—a problem that is often referred to as the Legislator's paradox, or simply the paradox of politics. Similarly, while Smith encouraged the magistrate to enact "rules" which "command mutual good offices to a certain degree," he hastened to add that, of all of the magistrate's duties, this one "requires the greatest delicacy."

While Smith and Rousseau frame this problem similarly, they differ in their response to it in at least two ways. First, there is much more at stake for Rousseau. Without civic virtue, there simply can be no political freedom. For Smith, by contrast, moral turpitude did not automatically destroy the fabric of society. The second principal difference—undoubtedly related to the first—is the extent to which the magistrate must concern himself with the opinions of the citizens he governs. While Smith's need only direct and constrain public opinion, Rousseau's must transform human nature. The explanation for these differences, the paper argues, lies in the difference between the two thinker's views on the role played by citizens in the formulation of public policy.

Dennis Rasmussen (Tufts): Smith, Rousseau, and the True Spirit of a Republican

Abstract
Adam Smith's review of Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality* culminates in the claim that "it is by the help of [Rousseau's] style, together with a little philosophical chemistry, that the principles and ideas of the profligate Mandeville seem in him to have all the purity and sublimity of the morals of Plato, and to be only the true spirit of a republican carried a little too far" (EPS, 251). I argued in my book on these two thinkers that the curious phrase "philosophical chemistry" is an implicit reference to Rousseau's fundamental doctrine of the natural goodness of humanity. I did not examine the last part of Smith's statement – that is, his reference to Rousseau embodying "the true spirit of a republican carried a little too far" – mostly, I confess, because of its manifest ambiguity. The term "republican" had a host of meanings in the eighteenth century, as it does today. Thus, it is not immediately clear what Smith meant by "the true spirit of a republican," or in what sense he thought Rousseau carried this spirit too far. The present paper seeks to rectify the omission in my earlier discussion by exploring these questions. I argue, against the claims of several scholars, that Smith was not referring to Rousseau's "republican" or "positive" conception of liberty, according to which true freedom is realized in and through collective self-government and obedience to the general will, but rather to his view that commerce is invariably corrupt and corrupting.

In the course of making this case, I consider Smith's and Rousseau's conceptions of liberty, arguing that their views are nearly diametrically opposed, but not (only) in the way that is generally assumed. On the level of politics, as is well known, Smith advocated negative liberty and stressed the dangers of positive liberty, while Rousseau advocated positive liberty and stressed the dangers of negative liberty. Yet on the level of the individual, I argue, Smith regarded a kind of positive liberty – namely, self-command – as a necessary component of a moral life, while Rousseau regarded negative liberty as a supreme good for those who are sufficiently free of destructive passions that they will refrain from abusing it.

Mark Hulliung (Brandeis): Rousseau and the Scottish Enlightenment: Connections and Disconnections

Abstract

My argument is that we should be much more careful about how we draw links between Rousseau and Adam Smith--and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. It was Adam Ferguson, not Adam Smith, who clearly addressed Rousseau when he set out at the beginning of the *Essay on the History of Civil Society* to refute the account of the "state of nature" that Rousseau had set forth in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality.* Ferguson's efforts to address Rousseau contrast sharply with the lack of any genuine analysis of Rousseau's writings in Hume's letters. As for Smith's early comments on the *Second Discourse,* they are very brief and, when they are not about Rousseau's literary style, may well be more about Rousseau's comments on Mandeville than about Rousseau.

It is Mandeville, not Rousseau, whom Smith targets in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments.* It is Mandeville whom Smith's teacher Francis Hutcheson was at pains to repudiate. It is Mandeville, again, who time and again was the figure against whom the leaders of the Scottish Enlightenment measured themselves in their quest to prove the compatibility of self-interest with virtue. One looks in vain for Rousseau in Smith's major writings. In recent years a number of scholars have written about what they take to be Smith's response to Rousseau. In fact, however, their commentaries are along the lines of how they believe Smith would have/should have responded to Rousseau.

Lack of adequate historical evidence is, then, one problem bedeviling the current scholarship. Another is that Rousseau is treated unfairly. He is said to have lost a debate with Adam Smith over commercial society which he could not possibly have won, since he was not a participant. Rousseau's challenge is to civilization as such; commercial society is not his focus.

What to do? One solution is for scholars to say that they are reasoning as political theorists rather than historians when they place Smith and Rousseau side by side. Another is for them to say they are thinking as comparative historians rather than historians recreating a conversation that actually took place. Finally, someone speaking as a political theorist and/or comparative historian should indicate how Rousseau might have responded to Smith, had he been familiar with his works. Turn about is fair play. Best of all would be to locate Smith and Rousseau in a larger comparative study of the Scottish and French Enlightenments.

Session 6 (1100-1230)

Panel A: Smith and Rousseau on Autonomy

Location: Fore Hall Chair: Brigitte Weltman-Aron (RA)

Hina Nazar (Illinois Urbana –Champ): Rethinking Autonomy: Rousseau and Adam Smith

Abstract

The ideal of autonomy remains one of the Enlightenment's most controversial legacies to the modern world. This paper seeks to reengage the concept of moral self-direction by comparing two Enlightenment contributions to it, as provided by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith. Crucial figures in the histories at once of liberalism and sentimentalism, Rousseau and Smith stand opposed to the rationalism characterizing the writings of the Enlightenment's most influential theorist of autonomy, Immanuel Kant. Yet they also elaborate a crucial split, within early liberalism, on the question of the relationship between autonomy and sociability—a split with little understood implications for current debates about autonomy and Enlightenment modernity. I argue that in contrast with Rousseau, Smith helps us understand moral independence as an achievement of a socially embedded subject, and thereby complicates some of the principal critiques directed at this pivotal norm of present day liberalism.

I take as my point of departure the curious figure of "other people's eyes" that permeates both Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and Rousseau's *Emile*. For Smith, social engagement is necessary to the emergence of the moral or impartial standpoint, which requires that "we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavour to view [our motives] as at a certain distance from us. But we can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them." Here the critical distance autonomy requires is impossible without "the eyes of other people." By contrast, this figure has a strictly negative connotation for Rousseau, a fierce critic not only of conventional society but also of the relative passions—the *amour-propre* or self-love that is activated in social intercourse. In describing the education of the autonomous man in *Emile*, Rousseau contends, "As soon as one must see with the eyes of others, one must will with their wills." Emile is educated to be a Robinson Crusoe transplanted into the heart of Europe, who retains, in important respects, the judgment of the solitary on an island.

I argue that Rousseauvian autonomy denotes a radical self-sufficiency that is vulnerable to many recent criticisms of autonomy, while Smith complicates the binary opposition of autonomy and sociability. As such, Smith's writings are productively engaged today by those who want to reclaim autonomy as a key liberal value worth fighting for.

Mark Hill (LSE): Actors and Spectators: Rousseau's response to eighteenth century debates on self-interest

Abstract

A debate between virtuous self-interest and social morality emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The historical narrative of these ideas has been touched on by others – such as Albert O. Hirschman, Pierre Force, and Eric MacGilvray – with nuance and detail, but broadly one can recognize two camps: those who saw public utility in self-interest through the positive externalities of commerce, and those who had serious concerns over the political outcomes of the entanglement of commerce and virtue. This paper follows these studies and attempts to locate Rousseau (primarily) and Smith (secondarily) within this debate. By looking at how their particular moral philosophies interact with their political thought it is argued that Rousseau is distinct from Smith in an important, but often confused, way: while some have argued that Rousseau is a moralist and Smith a philosopher of the political and social value of self-interest, it will be argued here that the opposite may be true. That is, despite Rousseau's "general will" and Smith's "impartial spectator" having been identified as similar moral tools used to overcome the negative aspects of self-interest through externalized self-reflection, it is argued that Rousseau is a moral rationalist who is skeptical of reason as a moral motivator, and thus dismisses the general will as a tool which can encourage personal moral action, while Smith is a moral realist, but a particularly soft one in regard to the motivational force of morality, and instead turns to rationality – through the impartial spectator – as a source of moral action. The upshot of this distinction being, Rousseau does not deny the power of commerce and self-interest as motivational forces, simply their social utility; social institutions like English coffeehouses – centres of politeness and *doux commerce* – should exist, and self-interest should motivate, but both need to be cleansed of the vice of commerce. That is, this paper argues that Smith is moral realist who relies on reason – specifically that one must be a *spectator* who can impartially and rationally reflect on situations in order to will moral ends – and Rousseau is a moral rationalist who relies on sentiment – one must have an interest in situations if they are to be a moral *actor*."

Supritha Rajan (Rochester): Autonomy and its Affects: Regret and Sympathy in Rousseau and Smith

Abstract

It has become a critical commonplace to read Rousseau's oeuvre as opposing the social ideals of citizenship, prevalent in his political writings, to those models of privacy, solitude, and domesticity that dominate his autobiographical and fictional work. Such diverging accounts of the relationship between the individual and society suggest that Rousseau remained conflicted as to whether models of liberal citizenship could temper modern alienation and thus potentially return us, however partially, to the *amour de soi* that prevailed in the state of nature. Rousseau, as is well-known, distinguished between *amour de soi* as a basic form of self-preservation that characterizes all living creatures from the self-interested vanity, or *amour propre*, that typifies human beings. Human sociality and a committed engagement with others in the public sphere function as an antidote to the corrosive effects of self-interest and a Hobbesian state of violence.

Rousseau's model of human sociality and pity greatly influenced Adam Smith, particularly Smith's theories of sympathy. Yet much like scholarship on Rousseau, the critical corpus on Adam Smith has also been dogged by polarities that contrast the principle of self-interest that dominates the *Wealth of Nations* to the ethos of sympathy that pervades the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*—what was once referred to as the Adam Smith Problem. This antinomy between civic virtue and private interest references a more pervasive Enlightenment dilemma. In this paper I recast this dilemma and the dualism sometimes attributed to Smith's and Rousseau's work by arguing that these tensions stem from the Enlightenment identification of human freedom with notions of individual autonomy. Enlightenment theories of autonomy abstract agents away from the plurality of relations and contexts in which their actions unfold and endlessly reverberate. As a result, they repeatedly confront a conflict between the model of autonomy they theorize and the indeterminate ends of any action, a conflict that undermines the very theory of individual responsibility they espouse. This problematic account of human freedom contributes, I contend, to the polarities that critics have noted in Rousseau's and Smith's oeuvres. We can thus better understand the apparent retreat from the public sphere of atavistic relations to the private experience of ethical relatedness as a response to inherent constraints within Enlightenment accounts of freedom and agency. This response carries with it an affective dimension. While Smith counters excessive *amour propre* in the marketplace through the fellow-feeling inwardly experienced as sympathy, Rousseau expresses ethical relatedness through the affective experience of regret. Thus rather than presenting human sociability and solitude as neatly bifurcated realms, Smith and Rousseau expose this schism as inherent to Enlightenment accounts of autonomy—a schism registered and sutured in each thinker through a moral affect.

Panel B: Conjectural History

Location: Room G466 Chair: Maria Pia Paganelli (IASS)

Zev Trachtenberg (Oklahoma): Smith and Rousseau on Habitation

Abstract

In this paper I will interpret several passages in Smith's *Lectures on Jurisprudence* in terms of a theory of human habitation I derive from Rousseau's *Discourse on Inequality*.

In the *Discourse* Rousseau depicts how human beings modify their physical environment, transforming it from a primordial condition to a fully humanized landscape. In this account Rousseau thus presents a dynamic understanding of habitation, in which a landscape is fashioned into habitat by the labor of its inhabitants—a phenomenon biologists call "niche construction." Rousseau's account foregrounds the direct relationship between degree of social and economic interaction among inhabitants and the intensity and extent of human niche construction.

I will consider Smith's remarks in the *Lectures* on the development of property by occupation and accession, and his remarks on opulence and the division of labor, in light of Rousseau's account. In these passages Smith grounds a conjectural history of human beings' use of their environment in their need to engage in niche construction. Unlike Rousseau, Smith presumes, rather than tries to explain, human sociability, and he likewise naturalizes the division of labor in a primordial impulse to exchange goods. However, Smith's account parallels Rousseau's by tracing the intensification of human modification of nature. And, Smith explicitly articulates Rousseau's idea that the criterion of habitability is not mere organic survival, but rather provision for a material standard of living that meets cultural norms.

Smith casts 18th Century European modes of habitation in a generally more positive light than does Rousseau; this is perhaps due to the former's greater acceptance of commerce and the latter's more austere republicanism. I will conclude by suggesting that their respective views can be seen as two contrasting implications of the single, general understanding of habitation I associate with Rousseau, by which a society's standard of habitability reflects its underlying conception of the good life. That conception of the good life in turn can be used as the basis for a normative critique of the society's interactions with its environment; the two authors' differences on the good life thus underlie different normative positions on what counts as a habitable environment, hence what society may do to make its environment habitable.

Spencer Pack (Connecticut College): Rousseau's Influence on Smith's Theory of Unintended Consequences, the Invisible Hand and Smith's Understanding of History

Abstract

I argue that Rousseau and Smith both had a modern theory of history as one of evolution, not of history as circular, as with the ancients, nor as history as necessarily one of progress. Moreover, as Hayek points out and Smith himself suggests, both Smith and Rousseau were in effect following and developing the argument in Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*; Volume II, not Volume I. Both Smith and Rousseau had a view of history as one of unintended consequences. However, Rousseau, largely in agreement with the ancients such as Aristotle, felt that unintended results were quite often bad; hence human history was also essentially not too good a story or evolvement. Smith, on the other hand, had many positive things to say about the historical development of human societies. Also, Smith viewed Rousseau's depiction of the wealth of society being generated by a deception of the true utility of material wealth as essentially accurate. Yet, Rousseau's harsh criticism of the material result was the product of a splenetic, depressed mind; a bit of mental illness. For rhetorical reasons, Smith used his invisible hand metaphor against Rousseau (and the ancients) to argue that unintended results may have beneficial outcomes; not that this is always the case, but it may happen often enough. Also, as opposed to Rousseau, Smith was in favor of the division of labour because, among other things, it increases output and eventually leads to an increase in population.

Session 7 (1400-1530)

Panel A: Sympathy/Pitie

Location: Fore Hall Chair: Christopher Martin (IASS)

Christel Fricke (Oslo): Self-love, Sympathy, and the Challenges of Freedom and Equality – Smith's Response to Rousseau

Abstract

Rousseau and Smith unanimously reject the motivational psychology of Hobbes and Mandeville: Humans' emotional dispositions to will and act include not only self-love but also a concern for other people, namely "pitié" (Rousseau) and "sympathy" (Smith). However, both authors vary considerably in their understanding of these dispositions and of the dynamics of their interaction. Still, they agree in attributing a high value to individual freedom and equality. And they are both aware of the fact that people are very different from each other in many respects and that these differences are enforced in commercial society. Indeed, Smith owes the inspiration to some of his harshest criticisms of the physical, social, and moral impact of commercial society on its members in general and on those of the working class in particular to Rousseau. The question is what becomes of freedom and equality under conditions of a commercial society. Rousseau and Smith agree that the answer to this question has to be political in kind. But their respective answers are very different. I shall try to give an account of this difference and trace it back to their different understandings of humans' basic emotional dispositions and needs.

Michelle Schwarze (Wisconsin-Madison) & John Scott (UC Davis): The Possibility of Progress: Smith and Rousseau on *Pitié*, Sympathy, and the Moral Economy

Abstract

A number of commentators have recently pointed to the remarkably similar way that Rousseau and Smith diagnose the psychological ills of commercial society, despite their divergence on the remedies that might be applied to improve social and moral conditions (e.g., Hanley 2008, 2009; Rasmussen 2008). We argue that one essential reason for this divergence consists in the difference between the two principles that motivate morality for Rousseau and Smith – pity and sympathy – and the ways in which these principles interact with self-love. We show that Rousseau's account of pity, in its interaction with both self-love and amour-propre, is fundamentally hierarchical in that it drives us to desire that others esteem us more than they esteem themselves. By contrast, we argue that Smith's notion of sympathy is not essentially hierarchical and rather operates through a process of mutual sympathy more likely to result in equal recognition and harmony. The moral economy is therefore not zero-sum for Smith, as it is for Rousseau. Instead Smith's positive sum understanding of the moral economy provides the basis for his measured optimism about the possibility of moral and economic progress that can result from interactive moral and economic markets (and indeed his divergence from Rousseau).

Panel B: Smith and Rousseau

Location: Room G466 Chair: Thierry C. Pauchant

Gordon Graham (Princeton Theological): Smith and Rousseau on Religion

Abstract

The lives of Smith and Rousseau have some interesting similarities. Their births and deaths fell securely within the 18th century, they lived about the same length of time, and both of them were born and raised in Calvinist countries. There are also broad similarities in their thought, the relationship between human nature and social organization being key to their works. Yet for all that, there are deep differences between them. One of the most striking relates to religion. Little is known about Smith's religious observance, and virtually nothing about his own religious beliefs. In sharp contrast, Rousseau's youthful conversion to Roman Catholicism and later return to Genevan Protestantism are important events in his life, and some of his most compelling writing is about his own religious belief. Though Smith, like Rousseau, clearly subscribes to some sort of Providentialism, he never explicitly engages in natural theology, and famously dropped his brief discussion of the theological topic of atonement from later editions of *TMS*. Rousseau, on the other hand, expressly engages in teleological arguments in preference to revelation, and in a long letter to Voltaire addresses the problem of evil. In short, while it would be hard to deny that religious faith was a matter of great moment to Rousseau, reading Smith leaves one with the impression that religious questions did not interest him very much.

Curiously though, Smith lends the Christian religion a significant role in social life, while Rousseau struggles (in the last chapter of the *Social Contract*) to give it any role at all. In this paper, I shall argue that this difference results not only from the contrasting roles that human nature plays in their philosophical theories, but from the fact that Rousseau's account of the human condition is at heart the sort of humanistic alternative to religion that Smith discounts.

Christopher Kelly & Heather Pangle (Boston College): Rousseau and Julie von Bondeli on the Moral Sense

Abstract

After the publication of *Julie* in 1761 and *Emile* the following year, Rousseau's celebrity caused him to be inundated with letters from admirers. Many of the correspondents were women or young men who sought advice or intellectual engagement with Rousseau. Among the most interesting of these correspondents was Julie von Bondeli (1732-1778) whose critical appreciation of *Julie* was given to Rousseau along with a related "Essay on the Moral Sense." Rousseau was impressed by these works and commented that she combined "Voltaire's pen and Leibniz's head." This led to a brief but interesting correspondence and epistolary friendship.

This essay will treat the exchanges between Rousseau and Bondeli, evaluate her treatment of *Julie* and explain her role as the center of an intellectual circle of admirers of Rousseau. Use will be made of Bondeli's letters about Rousseau as well as her correspondence with Rousseau. It will focus, in particular, on the issue of "the moral sense." It will conclude with a discussion of Rousseau and Bondeli's exchanges about Plato.

Bondeli illustrates her interpretation of the moral sense, derived from her reading of Francis Hutcheson, with a critique of Rousseau's portrayal of Wolmar. Bondeli endorses Rousseau's goal of showing a moral atheist and defends Rousseau against his critics. Her critique is unusual in that it is free of the moralism of many of Rousseau's critics and, instead, focuses on his claims to psychological realism. She raises an issue of central importance to Rousseau: the relation between the passions and intelligence. While Bondeli's treatment misses an important element of Rousseau's design, it sheds light on what he does accomplish. It will be argued that this critique helps us to understand the ultimate failure of Wolmar's plan to cure Julie and St. Preux of their love.

G & F Roosevelt (Metropolitan College of New York): Rousseau and Smith on Public and Private Education in Commercial Society

Abstract

In a two-part paper, Grace and Frank Roosevelt will compare Rousseau's and Smith's views on education in commercial society. Grace Roosevelt will argue that Rousseau's public and private educational models aimed to nurture resistance to 18th century commercial society, and Frank Roosevelt will argue that Smith's educational writings aimed to show people how to prepare for and benefit from commercial society.

After an introductory overview that situates both thinkers in terms of their responses to the idea of *doux commerce*, Grace will emphasize the anti-commercial purposes of the model for public education that Rousseau lays out in his *Considerations on the Government of Poland*. Rousseau envisioned Poland as an independent republic that could remain isolated from what he perceived to be the corrupting influences of the commercial economies surrounding it. Hence his proposals for public education stressed the need for Poland to turn inward and cultivate a patriotic love of the homeland. Focusing then on the model for private education that Rousseau proposes in *Emile*, Grace will argue that there too Rousseau's pedagogical vision was motivated by a deep distrust of commercial society. In the interest of nurturing the child's resistance to the seductive but degenerate world of *doux commerce*, Rousseau counsels parents and tutors to protect the young child's *amour de soi* while delaying or sublimating his *amour-propre*.

Frank Roosevelt will then show how Smith's views on education may point to more humane and egalitarian ways of addressing the challenges of education in commercial society. Smith like Rousseau believes that there is equality at birth, but an innate human disposition to truck barter and exchange fosters a division of labor that, along with "habit, custom, and education" results in inequality. Smith also observes that the division of labor has a *dehumanizing effect* on the working population and that it is the role of government to do something to prevent it. However, Smith does not insist that every child be obliged to attend a government-funded public school, for he considers considers private schools to be superior to public ones. Frank will end with Smith's point that teachers (particularly university professors) will be likely to put more effort into their teaching if they are rewarded in proportion to the number of students that attend their lectures—a commodification of the educational process that is clearly at odds with the anti-commerce arguments in the writings of Rousseau.

Session 8 (1600-1730)

Plenary and Discussion Session

Location: Room G466 Chair: Craig Smith (GU)

Charles Griswold(Boston): Self-falsification, Exchange, and Freedom: Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Dialogue

Adam Smith remarks in the *Wealth of Nations* that once the division of labor takes hold and interdependence is the norm, "[e]very man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society" (I.iv.1). We are certainly familiar with the charge that commercial society encourages the reduction of exchange (social as well as economic) to a sort of play-acting characterized by bad faith, false consciousness, an intense concern with appearances, and estrangement from one's true self. In the *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts* (the "First Discourse"), the *Preface to 'Narcissus'*, and especially the *Discourse on Inequality* (the "Second Discourse"), Rousseau famously insists that the phenomenon of not appearing as who or what one really is, of living "outside" as opposed to "within" oneself, constitutes a pervasive and profound defect of modern society in particular. Several of the relevant passages in the *Second Discourse* were among those translated by Smith in his review of that text, and yet, Smith does not comment on them explicitly.

In this paper, I offer thoughts about what Rousseau means when speaking of what I will call "self-falsification," and suggest that in the just mentioned texts Rousseau refines the notion by steps. I then deploy passages from Adam Smith as a way of fleshing out both the strongest version of Rousseau's claims and the tenability of Smith's response. I argue that the debate turns in good part on how one understands freedom or agency and their connection to spectatorship, role-playing, and delusion. With the help of Rae Langton's "Projection and Objectification" essay and some contemporary work on self-deception, I reflect on Smith's notion of agential freedom in view of Rousseau's claims. The hope is that constructing a sort of "dialogue" between Rousseau and Smith about these issues sheds light on questions that very much remain with us today.